Draft Bylaws Committee Report
for the LPC 2026 Convention

Rationale:

Bylaw 12 includes language intended to deal with the fact that our fiscal year started around the time of our convention, so that the Executive Committee that would be operating under the annual budget might be signiicantly different from the one that prepared the budget. However, we now operate with a fiscal year that matches the calendar year, so separating out the steps of "projecting" and "ratifying" the budget no longer makes much sense. In addition, because this amendment puts the vote requirement for budget ratification into the section where that subject is addressed, it no longer needs to be mentioned in another section.

Rationale:

The existing language about handling cases where a Program plank is alleged to be inconsistent with the Statemenet of Principles or the Platform makes no sense given the way that such planks are currently adopted. This language is left over from a time when Program planks were adopted by a vote of the convention, so it provides for challenges by delegates and for the Judicial Committee's decision to be reported back to the convention. Now such planks are adopted by the Executive Committee, which can happen at any time during the year, and generally not when the convention is in session. This updates the language so that objections can be raised by members more generally, at the time when it will actually make sense to do so, and requires the JC's decision to be reported to the Executive Committee and the membership.

Rationale:

At the 2021 Convention, the delegates adopted a bylaws amendment requiring that anyone who resigned their Central Committee membership, and later sought reinstatement, undergo a vetting period before their full voting rights could be restored. At the time, it was understood that reinstatement could occur in one of two ways:

1. The individual could rejoin as a non-voting "Associate" member for 12 months and then be automatically reinstated as a voting Central Committee Member; or

2. The Executive Committee – or the delegates at convention – could vote by majority to reinstate the member at any time.

However, the bylaw was worded in a way that has since been interpreted to mean that both methods of reinstatement require a vote of either the Executive Committee or the convention delegates, contradicting the original intent.

Additionally, the current language in Section 4 could be interpreted to mean that simply allowing dues to lapse triggers the procedures outlined in Section 7. Because Bylaw 6 already requires dues to be current, the extra language in Section 4 is unnecessary and potentially misleading. Moreover, the reference to Section 6 appears to have been in error when the amendment was originally adopted.

Rationale:

A special rule of order was adopted by the Executive Committee several years ago regarding the procedures for going into executive session during a meeting. This was primarily done because Robert's Rules of Order allows for actions to be taken during executive session, meaning motions can be made and voted on with no transparency. However it would be better for this rule to be included in the bylaws, because otherwise a future Executive Committee could simply remove it from the special rules of order.

In addition, the current rule does not make clear what matters may be discussed in executive session. This amendment will limit the topics that may be discussed in such sessions to the types that are typically considered appropriate, such as disciplinary and personnel matters and relations with other entities that may require confidentiality.

Rationale:

The bylaws currently require that the Executive Committee appoint a Financial Standards Committee, with the job of reviewing financial records and processes and reporting its findings back to the Executive Committee – a function similar to what in many organizations might be called an "audit committee". The Executive Comittee has adopted a rule that specifies that this committee should have three members, and that no current officer should be appointed to it since the effectiveness of this committee would be reduced if it were, in effect, auditing its own members. There seems to be general agreement that these are good policies, but it would be better to have this sort of policy in the bylaws so that some future Executive Committee cannot subvert the intent of the requirement, e.g., by appointing just the Chair or the Treasurer to serve as the "committee". In addition, this amendment would expand that restriction to apply to anyone serving as an assistant or "acting" officer, or as a paid employee or contractor, since similar concerns about conflict of interest might arise with them.

Rationale:

Platforms have been an important part of the LP's history since the beginning. There was even an "interim platform" before the first national convention. And our state party had its own Platform from the first state convention in 1973 up until 2022.

Functions served by LP platforms generally include: elaboration of the Statement of Principles to explain how our principles apply to particular issues, providing a reference for candidates in preparing their own statements on issues that come up in their campaigns, providing a reference for other party spokespersons (e.g., county chairs, media contacts) to address issues with which they may not be personally familiar, and serving as a starting point in preparing materials designed more specificallty for outreach and membership recruiting (e.g. brochures, videos, social media posts). Additionally, the continuous development of platforms, specifically the process of debating and voting on planks at conventions, has historically served several significant functions: helping new members understand the libertartian approach to applying our principles, helping determine on which issues there may be significant differences among members, and encouraging members who are interested in issues to attend conventions.

Functions served by having a state platform, in addition to a national one, include: allowing the platform to address issues that are specific to that state, or of special interest in that state, giving delegates to state conventions experience with the kinds of things that are debated at national conventions, giving members who may want to get involved with national platform development a chance to serve on a platform committee, and developing ideas and text that may then be adopted at the national level.

There were, however, many who questioned the value of our state having its own platform. Among the arguments against this: it was redundant since it addressed many of the same issues, there was the potential for confusion if the national and state platforms described our position on a position using different language, debate and voting took up too much time at state conventions, some parts of our state platform had become outdated or overly wordy but remained in place because nobody was willing to put the work into updating them but delegates were reluctant to delete them without having something better.

Increasing discontent with the independent state platform model led, in 2019, to a move to delete the entire contents of our state platform (overturned by a ruling of our Judicial Committee) and then, in 2022, a change to our bylaws to simply declare the national Platform to be our state platform.

And that's how things stand now. We have no way to add to our platform anything about issues that are specific to California, arising from the structure of government in this state, in response to laws or proposed laws in this state, or of special interest to Californians because of geography or industries or demographic factors. Delegates to our conventions no longer have the opporunity to participate in platform development, either by serving on a platform committee or by simply voting. Candidates for state and local office, county chairs, and people who are trying to develop membership outreach programs for Calfornia voters have no common standard of reference for the formal Libertarian position on anything that is not addressed in the national Platform.

This proposal addresses these problems by retaining the idea of making use of the national Platform, but allowing our state convention to adopt additional planks when the delegates deem that useful. This change will not be a return to the way things were prior to 2022. It will give us all the benefits of being able to address issues that are unique to California or of special interest to Californians, and provide a way – more limited than in the past but still significant – for delegates at our state convention to be involved in that process, while avoiding most of the problems that led to dissatisfaction with maintaining a separate state platform.

Because we will still have the national Platform as the basis for our own, delegates to our convention will be able to focus their attention on issues where having our own plank would serve some clear purpose, making the time spent on developing language, debating, and voting much more productive. This proposal specifically requires that any planks we adopt not be in conflict with the national Platform, but there will be less chance of that issue even coming up because our planks won't be trying to address the same set of issues. And when any of our state planks becomes out-dated or simply redundant, if there is a national plank that does the job better or the same way, delegates will be a lot more willing to just delete our plank than they were in the past, since the alternative won't be "nothing".

This proposal defines the rules for adopting, amending, and deleting planks, and sets up a Platform Committee structured in the same way and with simiilar procedures as now used for the Bylaws Committee.

Rationale:

If there is going to be a Platform Committee and the Judicial Committee is going to be called upon to resolve questions about whether state platform planks are in conflict with the Statement of Principles or the national Platform, it would be better that members of the Platform Committee not also be serving on the Judicial Committee.

Rationale:

For the LP's national convention, delegates are selected by the state affiliate parties, with each state allowed to send a number of delegates based primarily on the fraction of the national membership residing in that state. Up until 2007, our state conventions were constituted similarly, with delegates selected by and representing local "regions" (generally corresponding to counties, but there were some counties that voluntarily grouped together to operate as a single region, and the largest county, Los Angeles, was divided into several regions). There were also a few classes of ex officio delegates, selected independent of that formula, including current members of the state Executive Committee and Libertarians who were serving in public office, but the vast majority of the delegates were selected by the regional organizations. The allocations for the counties were set by a formula based on the number of central committee members (voting members) associated with that region, as a fraction of the statewide total, so the total allocation stayed approximately the same from year to year, though the formula itself could be adjusted to constrain the total size of the convention. As things stood in 2007, the total theoretical delegate count, applying that forumula and including ex officio delegates, was approximately 400, though actual total attendance did not normally reach that number.

That system provided several benefits. Members who were selected as delegates tended to be ones who were active in their county. The prospect of selection was an incentive to attend at least one local meeting, the one where the selection took place. Those attending that meeting had reason to discuss what was going on with the state organization. County-level activists had reason to consider who, amond their members, were most suitable to serve as delegates. State-level activists, including candidates for state Executive Committee positions, had more reason to pay attention to activites at the county level, because that was where the peoople who would be state convention delegates were to be found. Counties that expected to have more members interested in serving as delegates than allowed by the formula had an additional incentive to recruit more members, and to get their existing members to renew, fostering a competitive spirit among many of the counties. Overall, the result was more awareness and interest among the county organizations about what was happening at the state level, and vice versa.

That system also served to moderate the influence of counties based on proximity to the location of the convention. This, in turn, also helped reduce the incentive for EC nembers to push for a location that they thought would result in better attendance by those who would vote their way, or to avoid having it where those who would vote against them would show up. Everybody always likes having the convention nearby, but at least everybody knew that this would not also be a way for their counties to have significantly "more than their share" of influence in the decisions made at the convention. It also provided, along with mechanisms like the 90-day "seasoning" requirement, a certain degree of "anti-takeover" protection. A group, internal or external, trying to get control of the convention could not do so just by recruiting a lot of supporters in the area near the convention to show up that weekend. This was particularly relevant in presidential election years, when it might have been tempting for a well-funded candidate for our nomination to pay supporters to attend. A group could still theoretically get control by recruiting enough members all across the state, taking control of the county organizations, and then selecting their own people as delegates, but that would be a much harder project requiring an extended time period for planning and implementation.

Criticisms of this system included: Members who were not active in their county-level organization but who could make a positive contribution at the state convention might be overlooked and not get selected. People from counties that didn't have functioning organizations might not be able to attend at all. If a county organization was dominated by some faction – either ideological or just a "clique" of friends – they might use their control of the county meeting to keep somebody not in their group from being named as a delegate, even if not enough of their own group were interested in going themselves. And one of the arguments that probably was most significant in getting the system abolished – why would we want to limit attendance? Why keep out people who want to particiapte, in our biggest event of the year? A bigger convention would be more fun, more financially viable, and allow for more successful fundraising at the banquet.

Unforunately, due to the significant drop in membership in recent years, that last expected benefit has not been realized. There simply aren't that many active members now, across the entire state, interested in attending our state convention to give us a convention as large as the ones we used to have regularly under the previous system. In most recent years the total number of people voting has been under 100, some years a lot lower. However, even though the total attendance has been much lower, the issues that motivated the earlier system have not entirely gone away -- at the most recent convention, more than 1/4 of the voting members were affiliated with a single county. Also, our continued use of the term "delegate" for the members voting at our state convention has been criticized, since they are not sent by and do not represent anybody other than themselves.

This proposal would establish a hybrid system, giving the county organizations the primary role in selecting delegates, but with other members able to be seated to whatever extent the county organizations were uninterested in or unable to play that role. Each county would have a numerical limit calculated in a manner similar to the system we had prior to 2008. Delegates selected by a county organization – typically by election at their own annual meeting, though this would be up to each county to determine in their own bylaws – would have priority for seating at the state convention. There would also be provision for certain kinds of ex officio delegates as in the previous system. However, anybody not selected as a delegate in this manner would be able to volunteer as an "alternate", eligible to vote at the convention in the same way as a delegate, subject only to the numerical limit for his/her county. This means that in the case of a county that fails to select anybody, either because they didn't manage to hold a meeting for that purpose or just didn't want to bother, that county would be represented entirely by people who self-selected, just as they are now. Similarly, members from counties that have no county organization would continue to be able to attend, self-selecting (but still subject to the limit for their county).

This proposal includes a formula that would entitle each county to have one delegate for each 1/200 of the statewide membership. So, for example, a county that had 5% of the statewide membership would be represented by up to 10 delegates/alternates. The largest county, Los Angeles, having about 16% of the membership, could have 32. This number would be rounded up, so even the smallest county would be represented by at least one person. And as with the old system, every county chair would be an ex officio delegate, so as a practical matter the smallest counties would typically be able to have two representatives.

It is important to understand that implementing this system now would not likely, in the short term, keep anybody who wants to attend and vote at our state convention from doing so. It will therefore also not, in the short term, provide many of the benefits associated with that limitation, e.g., additional incentive for counties to grow their membership. The formula would allow for a total convention size several times what we have had in recent years. Even the county that had the largest number of members in attendance at the most recent convention, Santa Clara, would not have hit their limit if this system had been in place. However, having this system in place would provide some protection, in the short term, from extraordinary efforts to "pack" the convention geographically. The number from Santa Clara County would have been below the limit, but not by much. Counties that are near the location of the convention will always be better represented, but nobody would be able to use any county, no matter how large or how close to a future convention, to control the whole convention, by filling their allocation.

However, we will, hopefully, be growing our membership, first to reach the levels we attained in the past (when the benefits of county selection did play a significant role) and then even further! Not only will selection by county provide more benefits as we grow larger, putting this hybrid approach in place now will provide a natural transition path to that result. As increasing membership numbers make the allocation formula more relevant, more members will start to care about being selected that way, and more counties will start taking that process seriously. We won't need to decide, either in advance or as a response to some internal political crisis, to "switch" to county representation -- it will just naturally become a more important part of the picture as overall membership increases, and as a larger and larger fraction of our counties become organized.

This proposal gives us some of the advantages of the previous system now, is not likely to prevent anybody who actually wants to attend from doing so any time soon, and allows the way our membership is represented at our convention to naturally adjust in keeping with the significant growth in membership that we all want to see in the future.

Rationale:

The requirement that the Executive Committee meet in-person at some time not connected with the convention is a holdover from when in-person meetings were the best option we had. Getting together in one place imposes significant costs on EC members, both financial and in terms of travel time. It also makes it more difficult for the membership at large, who have now become accustomed to the convenience of access via Zoom, to observe the meetings. There are times when meeting in person can be useful, and times when the additional cost can be minimized, e.g., if a meeting is held in connection with some other libertarian event to which many EC members wouuld be traveling anyway. And the EC would still be able to do that. But it makes no sense for EC members to incur those costs just to fulfill an arbitrary quota of such meetings.

Rationale:

Currently the Bylaws only provide a process for the suspension of officers and Operations Committee members. The meaning of "suspension" in the bylaws is the first step in removing the officer, which is followed by the opportunity for the suspendee to appeal to the Judicial Committee (JC), however in the current bylaw the JC must rule on the suspension within three days, which precludes the opportunity for a hearing. Further the current bylaw doesn't make any provisions for the suspension/removal of any other member of the Executive Committee.

Since all members of the Executive Committee are elected by the membership at convention, removal should require the opportunity for a hearing rather than just assuming the JC would have sufficient information to either agree with or overturn the removal.

The Operations Committee, on the other hand, is a sub-committee of the Executive Committee whose members are appointed by the Executive Committee, therefore removal from that committee should not require the opportunity for appeal as the appointing body has the authority to remove members of sub-committees.

This will remove the provisions for a member of the Operations Committee to appeal to the JC for a removal from that committee while providing due process for all Executive Committee members that were elected by the membership, by requiring that they be given notice of their suspension and giving them the opportunity for a hearing to be held to appeal their removal.

Rationale

The Operations Committee was established as a body that could act much more quickly than the full Executive Committee, in the days when the Executive Committee only met about four times per year, and when meeting electronically was not a practical option for a group that size. Now the EC typically meets monthly, electronically, and can be convened in as little as seven days, so the need for a different body that can act more quickly is far reduced. In addition, the Operations Committee has not been operating effectively in recent years. It has sometimes been difficult to get it to meet, even when the EC wes depending on it to do so to deal with a particular matter. It has also at times taken action on matters that would have been more appropriately addressed at a meeting of the full EC, and without the transparency features assocated with a meeting of the full EC.

Rationale

If the convention decides to eliminate the Operations Committee, reference to the Operations Committee in respect to membership of the Judicial Committee should also be removed.

Rationale

If the convention does not eliminate the Operations Committee, the way that its membership is determined should be restored to what it was for almost its entire history – the Chair plus four other members selected by the Exective Committee. This allowed the EC to take into account whether a member was likely to serve this role well, including availabilty to participate in a quickly-called meeting. The very recent (adopted in 2024) change to have the committee consist of the four officers plus just one additional member may have seemed reasonable, but it has not worked well in practice. The other officers are elected by the convention mostly on the basis of considerations that have little to do with a person's suitability for serving on the Operations Committee. The EC would still be allowed to select any or all of the officers to serve on the Operations Committee if they were a good fit for the job, but they should not be assigned this role automatically.